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Abstract
This article analyses entry order decisions of incumbent firms diversifying from other
industries (de alio entrants) in new markets. We study this issue in the Security Software
Industry, a high turbulent industry in which de alio firms were first technological movers but
start-ups dominate the downstream product market. With a generalized Tobit estimation
of observed entry order decisions, we find that pre-entry firm capabilities that should
represent strategic options do not significantly explain firm entry order. The article argues
that inertial decisions more than rational assessments drive de alio entry order in Security
Software.
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Introduction
E
ntry order decision is one of the most important
strategic options (Mitchell, 1991).1 When a new market
ignites, incumbent firms in other industries (the de
alio entrants) face the pivotal decision of whether to enter
promptly seizing first mover advantages, or to wait until the
market becomes stable (i.e. when a standard consolidates).2
A classical example is the case of the radio producers and
the emerging television-receiver market during the 1940s
(Klepper and Simons, 2000).
From a researcher point of view, this strategic question is
even more interesting when R&D and innovation dictate
the competitive rules in a new market. De novo entrants
could imitate knowledge developed by de alio firms and
take advantage of their strategic mistakes in the entry order
(Christensen, 1997).
In this respect, we would like to highlight two essential
regularities. The first is that de alio entrants usually own a
diversified technological portfolio and an important
strategic advantage due to their experience in other
business areas. These firms, that tend to be large and old,
produce also by far the largest part of world innovations
and patents and they control important downstream co-
specialized assets (Pavitt et al., 1989; Hall, 1993).
Second, a wide collection of industry cases shows how de
alio entrants prefer to adopt wait-and-see strategies, leaving
to de novo firms the task to open new markets (Schnaars,
1994). In addition, empirical evidence (Bhide, 2000)
suggests that not only founders of innovative ventures are
often former employees of de alio entrants but also they
start their businesses exploiting sleeping capabilities of
de alio organizations.
Therefore, the creation of new markets and the diffusion
of innovations are influenced by two different forces: (i) the
ability of latecomers, usually de alio entrants, in surmount-
ing product pioneers; and (ii) the importance of first mover
advantages gained by early-entrants, usually de novo firms,
that are imitators of the leading technology (Carroll et al.,
1996). It is straightforward that the entry order decision
of de alio entrants represents the key issue to understand
this mechanism.
Current literature leaves significant room to improve our
knowledge on entry order decisions of de alio entrants
given that the ‘where to enter’ question is largely more
debated than the ‘when to enter’ question (e.g. Silverman,
1999). Therefore, the aim of this work is to understand
whether, aware of this context, de alio entrants take entry
order decisions in new markets with a rational perspective.
Or whether, conversely, holds the opposite view, that sees
the de alio entry order driven by inertial rules that do not
take into account all information available (Henderson and
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Clark, 1990). In a rational context, the pre-entry firm
capabilities that represent strategic options (Kogut and
Kulatilaka, 2001) for the targeted market should influence
entry order decisions. On the other hand, inertia would
deprive firms of the use of entry order as a strategic tool
and, as a corollary, of the optimal exploitation of the firm
capability as real options.
We investigate the entry order decisions of de alio
entrants with data from Security Software Industry (SSI).
SSI represents an ideal test-bed. In SSI, de alio entrants that
were first technological movers were late to enter into the
final product markets, leaving the opportunity to dominate
the industry to the de novo entrants. Focusing on de alio
firms, we estimate a generalized Tobit equation that
predicts the significant drivers of the entry order decision.
In so doing, we select first the sample of de alio entrants in
SSI and second, we construct a control sample of potential
entrants. We use as core covariates two pre-entry firm
capabilities that are often used as strategic options in the
literature: patents and alliances. We find that patents and
alliances are not statistically significant in explaining entry
order of de alio entrants while sector variables and firm
profitability are instead significant. This evidence supports
the hypothesis that de alio entry order follows an inertial
decision rule based on the observation of sector and firm
general characteristics, instead of the strategic use of firm
capabilities as real options targeted for the new markets.
Our work is embedded in two streams of literature. Many
contributions show how de alio entrants are more likely to
be followers than first movers into new product area. They
interpret this evidence as a rational behaviour of many
companies that prefer to adopt a strategy of waiting until
the uncertainty of new markets lowers and customer
preferences consolidate (Mitchell, 1991). On the other
hand, the problems of organizational inertia could be an
alternative explanation. De alio entrants show inefficiencies
during the phase of recognition, interpretation and use of
disperse capability portfolios. Therefore, they are the worst
fitted organizational forms to cope with breakthrough
innovations and markets (Christensen, 1997). Our paper
constitutes therefore an attempt to test simultaneously for
the validity of these two traditions using as a test-bed a
young industry where the dominant organizational form is
the start-up.
Along this view, this article provides one of the few
systematic empirical studies that shows the drivers of
de alio entry order decision. Several investigations
have already studied the effects of entry order on firm
performance (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), much
less is known about firm-specific drivers of entry order. We
think that our work contributes to this understudied
portion of the literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section builds the theoretical background while the
subsequent section proposes a simple model. Further
section shows the empirical results from SSI data and the
final section concludes the paper.
Theoretical background
Literature agrees that de alio entrants in new markets
(i.e. entry by incumbents from other sectors) are usually
latecomers (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell,
1991). Some authors have explained this behaviour as the
outcome of a rational firm choice, while others as the
outcome of organizational inertia.
For example, Mitchell (1989, 1991) points out that early
entry could convey risks for de alio firms especially if new
markets require new co-specialized downstream assets that
are difficult to be rapidly built. Moreover, de alio firms
usually apply better strategies of imitation and catching-up,
once newcomers have tested new products and markets.
The costs of imitation and late entry are usually lower than
the costs generated by the new market uncertainties
(Christensen, 1997). Another important issue is that de
alio firms could have low incentives to enter in new market
niches because they face problems related to the canniba-
lization of their existing markets. New goods may reduce
sales of existing products (Tushman and Anderson, 1986;
Aron and Lazear, 1990; Burgelman, 1994; Klepper, 2001) so
that wait-and-see strategies are best fitted. According to
Cho et al. (1998), late entry may be the only realistic option
for many de alio firms given their competitive posture. De
alio firms experience great opportunity costs in investing
resources into risky markets, and so they wait until the
uncertainty lowers or when new industries and market
characteristics become similar to those of existing markets
(Smith and Cooper, 1988).
To centre the arguments of the discussion, the analysis
on firm pre-entry capabilities is pivotal to understand the
entry order decision. Firm capabilities are considered as
real options that make firms able to respond to environ-
mental conditions characterized by high level of uncer-
tainty, as in the case of new markets (Kogut and Kulatilaka,
2001). Therefore, in a rational setting, the diverse endow-
ments of firm capabilities that are real options should
dictate the pace of firm entry order.
Granted this, a large stream of heterogeneous articles
discusses the inertia of de alio firms when they cope with
innovations and new markets. Henderson and Clark (1990)
highlight two levels of inertia. The first level is a myopic
inertia and it refers to the firm inability to recognize the
potential links between firm existing capabilities and new
business opportunities. Therefore, the main problem in de
alio entry decision is not the creation of capabilities that are
strategic options in new markets, but in the recognition of
these capabilities as strategic options. In the same line, Dosi
and Kogut (1993) stress the strategic relevance of the failure
to recognize robust matches among firm capabilities,
organization structures and market applications. In fact,
de alio firms could show inefficiencies during the phase
of recognition and interpretation of the environment, a
preliminary condition of any strategic actions and
responses. In a seminal work, Jelinek (1977: 21) points
out that these rigidities are generated by the fact that de alio
firms interpret environments with a programmed vision,
because ‘they only see what they are programmed to
perceive’. Similarly, other authors (Barr, 1998; Grever and
Taylor, 2000) investigate the links between the cognitive
process of manager teams and the timing of strategic
changes. They find that in de alio firms the process of
interpretation is time consuming. This prevents managers
to respond quickly to potential opportunities. Since
changes in activities are consistent and follow changes in
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interpretations, they generate adaptive instead of anticipat-
ing behaviours. Levinthal and March (1993: 97–99) use the
term myopia in assessing problems with change and
innovation. As these authors state, ‘learning has its own
traps’, because ‘problems that are not seen do not exist’.
The application of firm rationality on future markets
and customers is a costly process that organizations
activate when the profitability of existing markets
decreases. This view is similar to Brock and Hommes’
(1997): economic agents use new rational tools only when
there is high variance in the realized profits, while they
prefer to use simple rules of behaviour, that is, consolidated
routines a` la Nelson and Winter (1982), when prediction
errors are small.
The second level of inertia is the procedural inertia. This
inertia makes de alio entrants slow in responding to
innovative challenges even when they perfectly realize the
strategic link between capabilities and new markets. Several
scholars (Burgelman, 1994; Dowell and Swaminathan, 2000)
illustrate how re-orienting an organization structure is
a time consuming operation. In interviews conducted
by Dougherthy and Heller (1994), product innovation
managers confirm that de alio organizations tend to face
problems in adapting rapidly to new environments. Inertia
appears when the speed of reorganization is lower than the
rate at which external conditions change. Therefore, de alio
entrants have slow response times not because they are
slow in detecting the link between capabilities and
opportunities, but because the process of transforming
capabilities in strategic options inside organization struc-
tures takes longer (Dougherthy and Hardy, 1996). The
presence of pre-existing practices, coordination procedures
and specificities prevents de alio firms to make quickly
operative the capability platform useful for the new product
markets. Firm internal financial markets could generate
these inefficiencies. Chesbrough (2000) illustrates several
cases in which the internal financial market of de alio
entrants fails in providing financial back-up to innovative
projects that create new capabilities.
A simple probabilistic representation
Firm pre-entry capabilities that represent strategic options
should affect entry order decisions (Kogut and Kulatilaka,
2001). This means that heterogeneity in the capability
distribution in de alio entrants should account for
heterogeneity in the entry order decisions. Given the
targeted market, some firms will perform better with a
wait-and-see strategy because they need to build up the
required resources, while firms that already own the
required capabilities could instead enter promptly.
Let us assume that for each firm i, the total discounted
net profits of an entry in a new market is:
Pti ¼ PtðviÞ ð1Þ
where t is 1otoT, with T a final long-run time horizon.
vi indicates the firm-specific capabilities tailored to
extract profits in the new market. Firms show different
values of vi, viz they show heterogeneity in owning the
‘right’ capability platform for the new market. We impose
that viBC, where C is a continuous random distribution.
The firm compares the potential entry profits with a
not-entry option. The not-entry profits equals to
P0 ¼ PðzÞ ð2Þ
z¯i is the vector of pre-determined firm assets, that is,
exogenous or quasi-exogenous firm characteristics that are
not strictly linked with the performance in the new market.
Given z¯i, each firm is identified by the vector (vi) that
characterizes the strategic firm posture in the decision
of entry.
Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) and Winter (1987) highlight
that firms are characterized by several capabilities that
could be applied only in the existing firm businesses or that
could be used to compete in new end-markets. These
capabilities represent ex ante strategic options. For
example, consider the case of a US radio producer that
enters in the emerging US television-receiver market during
the 1940s (Klepper and Simons, 2000). The radio producer
could own particular technological expertises (e.g. a
patented shadow mask tube technology) or have recently
acquired some local key distributor for the television-
receiver market. By contrast, if this potential entrant is
from Maryland or from California, or if the founder has or
not a Ph.D. in Communication engineering are clearly
variables that control for some pre-determined and quasi-
exogenous firm characteristics. In the followings, we will
indicate with vi the strategic option variables and z¯i the
pre-determined quasi-exogenous assets.
Assuming a perfect foresight, firms choose whether to
enter in the new market, and then, if they enter, the optimal
entry order. So, a firm i will decide to enter in the new
market if exists at least one t1A[1,T] that satisfies
Pt(vi)4P0(z¯i). If Pit(vi)pP0(z¯i)8tA[1,T] the firm will not
enter. Given the entry, then a rational firm will decide the
optimal t n that maximizes Pt(vi) and the observed entry
order equals to t n|Pt n(vi)4Pt(vi)8tA[1,T].
So, the optimal entry order decision will be:
ti ¼ t if
Qt ðviÞXQ0 ðziÞ
ti ¼ 0 if
Qt ðviÞpQ0 ðziÞ 8t 2 1;T½ 

ð3Þ
From equation (3), the following equation (4) solves the
entry decision (yes/no) for the firm i. As one could observe,
the entry decision is mainly a function of the z¯i variables:
Prob viX
Yt 1 Yy
ðzÞ
" #( )
¼ 1C
Yt 1 Y0
ðziÞ
" #( )
ð4Þ
Given the entry, the observed optimal entry order t n
should be mainly influenced by vi, with t
n¼ h(vi). General-
izing these considerations, given a dichotomous variable
Y¼ 0, 1 that explains the entry decision, and a discrete
variable J¼ t n representing the optimal entry order, given
the entry, we could expect that
Y ¼ gðzÞ þ ei
Ji ¼ hðviÞ þ Zi

ð5Þ
Let us now introduce the two types of inertia. The myopic
inertia implies that firms do not observe vi because they
have difficulties in recognizing potential applications of
their actual capabilities in the new markets. Under this
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myopic assumption, we could reasonably suppose that
firms could only observe the capabilities of the average firm
entered in the new market, defined as m. So, firms will take
the decision of entry according to a simple rule:
Pt(m)4P0(z¯i). The entry decision and the time of entry
are now influenced by z¯i and by the current capability
platform of firm entered in the new market, m. Put it simply,
a firm looks at the average characteristics of the entered
firms, compares them to its profitability and capabilities
and it decides the entry.
Let us turn now the attention to the possible effects of a
procedural inertia. Under this assumption, firms could
estimate correctly their optimal t n, given vi, but they cannot
make the decision operative. In other words, the observed
time of entry of each firm is tobserved¼ t nþ Pi, where Pi is the
lag-time due to procedural inertia. In other words, the
process of creating the capability base necessary to enter at
t n is time consuming.
According to Dougherthy and Hardy (1996), firms
affected by this type of inertia could not reasonably predict
Pi. Moreover, Pi is usually a function of some exogenous
variables like size, level of organization rigidity, informa-
tion flow structure that will enter in our definition of z¯i. The
higher is Pi, the more the observed entry order will be
influenced again by z¯i.
With the introduction of inertia, the principal finding is
that inertial firm decisions are driven mainly by exogenous
variables z¯i not by the firm capabilities that represent
strategic options. On the other hand, full rational firm
decisions of entry-vs-not entry depend mainly from z¯i
variables while decisions of entry order, given the entry, is
driven by those firm capabilities that are strategic options
to compete into the targeted market, vi. In this respect,
perfect rational firm decision is a twofold process that
accounts for the entry decision and the entry order
decision. While in the inertial framework, firms blend the
twofold decision in a unique assessment. These findings are
quite intuitive: If entry order is a strategic tool, the decision
of entry (yes/no) should account for different variables than
the entry order decision (e.g. Lieberman and Montgomery,
1988). Concisely, the entry decision is a two-step process
that accounts for the effective profitability of entering in
new markets, and for the ways this profitability could be
strategically improved through the correct decisions on
entry order. If firms do not use entry order to compete,
their decision tree collapses in a unique choice.
The SSI
SSI history begins during the mid-1970s, when the market
opportunities arising from the military sector spurred
established electronic firms to accumulate knowledge in
SSI. Table 1 shows the most important firms for patents
granted and cited in US Patent Office and Trademark
Office’s (USPTO) 380 class ‘Cryptology’ between 1976 and
1992. Large ICT firms and university departments were the
first technological movers.
Patented algorithms, especially in the USPTO class 380
‘Cryptology’, are fundamental to compete in SSI. A crypto
algorithm is a procedure that takes the plain text data and
transforms it into cipher text. This process could be
reversed with a secret key (the usual password). The core of
security products is the mathematical procedure that lies
behind the encryption of data. Patents offer therefore
a good protection mechanism against imitation and
preservation of intellectual proprietary rights.
From the second half of the 1980s, the industry landscape
has dramatically changed. The development of the PC
market and Internet gave rise to a demand for civilian
purposes, introducing new market needs and products.
Estimates from the International Data Corporation3 eval-
uated the world market of SSI at 2.17 billion dollars in 1997
and 3.2 billion dollars in 1998, with an estimate of 4.4
billion dollars for 1999. With a wide product line, SSI could
be now defined as an industry specialized in the design,
development and support of security software solutions,
namely products that protect data and software on
computers and networks.
The increased civilian demand has spurred a flow of firm
entry since 1989, the year when the first product was released
in the market, making SSI one of the ‘hot’ sectors of the 1990s
(The Economist, 2002). SSI firm entry is basically a de novo
entry phenomenon. Hoover’s data show that by 1998 the top
15 market leaders in SSI were all start-ups, accounting for
about 43% of the total world market. These top 15 start-ups
were granted 88 patents in 380 USPTO class by 1999, with 446
backward citations. Looking at the most important firms
cited by these 88 patents, large ICT firms still remain in the
leading positions. This highlights a technological dependence
of start-up technology upon the knowledge created by large
firms (see Table 2).
De alio ICT firms that were the first technological movers
and the largest producers of patented inventions, entered
Table 1 Most cited firms in 380 (Cryptology) USPTO Patent Class, sample
patents 1976 1992
Firm Citations (C) Patents (P) C/P
IBM 528 46 11.47
Motorola 226 24 9.41
Scientific Atlanta 202 18 11.22
Pitney Bowes 165 16 10.31
Qualcomm 97 3 32.33
AT&T 97 8 12.12
Pioneer 95 9 10.55
Philips 95 7 13.57
Aisin Seiki 83 6 13.83
Stanford University 80 2 40
M.I.T. 75 2 37.5
NEC 72 6 12
General Instruments 68 8 8.5
NCR 63 5 12.6
Hitachi 62 4 15.5
VISA 53 2 26.5
Total 2061 166 17.34
Other 2520 224 11.81
Data source is the USPTO. First column lists the firms ranked by
number of citations received. Second column the number of
backward citations, third column the number of patents. The last
column shows the ratio between citations and patents. This table
shows which are the most important firms cited in the Cryptology
technology. As one can see, large ITC firms are the most
important sources of patent knowledge spillovers.
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into SSI with their own products in the last years of the
1990s, on average 10 years after the first successful products
of de novo entrants. The evidence presented strongly
suggests that, in SSI de alio entrants, even if they were
first mover innovators, choose to enter only when the new
market was consolidated.
Empirical evidence
The sample
Product introduction data give firm entry information. We
resort on Infotrac’s Promt database that, from a large set of
trade journals, magazines and other specialized press,
reports several categories of ‘events’ classified by industrial
sectors. This database is the new version of the Predicast
database that has been used extensively in the literature. We
search for all press articles that report a ‘Product announce-
ment’, a ‘New software release’ and a ‘Software evaluation’ in
SSI (SIC Code 73726). Very simply, in this paper firm entry
is when the first firm product is announced.
From 1989 to 2003, among the 471 firms that entered
in the market for encryption products, 6.15% were de alio
entrants (entry by diversification), while 93.85%
were de novo (entry by new firm formation). In this paper,
we focus only on de alio order of entry. As a matter
of fact, the basic evidence is that only 29 de alio firms
enter SSI in about 15 years of industry history. The total
number of products released in the market since 1989 is
1269; de alio firms account for 16.39% of these software
packages.
For our econometric purposes, we need a control sample
of potential de alio entrants in SSI that do not enter the
market. Our conservative approach is to select the sample
not randomly, but to use some ad hoc criteria of sampling.
To put our hypotheses under a more severe test, we aim
indeed to select only the incumbents that could have had
the highest probability to enter in SSI. In so doing, we
identify as potential entrants firms that were granted at
least a patent in 380 class or firms that signed at least a
marketing alliance in SSI during our sample period and that
are not product releasers. In fact, patents and alliance signal
that firms own at least some technology and downstream
assets required to enter in SSI. With these criteria, we build
a control sample of 145 established firms, which could be
defined as potential entrants in SSI. The total firm sample is
composed by 174 firms (145þ 29). Table 3 shows some
preliminary statistics of potential entrants by sector.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of de alio entry order; the
median value equals 8, meaning that 50% of all the
incumbents enter after a lag of 8 years from product
pioneers. Therefore, the reaction response of incumbents is
characterized by some sort of wait-and-see attribute.
Econometric model and dependent variables
We estimate a generalized Tobit equation (Amemiya, 1987),
that is a simultaneous equation model. This model
accounts for a dichotomous decision regression (1/0) and
a time regression equation. The generalized Tobit can be
written as:
Y ¼ bvvþ bzzþ e
J ¼ dvvþ dzzþ r

ð6Þ
where Y¼ 0, 1 is the dependent variable capturing the entry
decision, J¼ 1, 2, 3y is the dependent variable capturing
the entry time decision, given the entry. The generalized
Tobit allows indeed testing simultaneously the two types of
decisions and the corresponding different magnitude and
Table 2 Most cited firms by patents granted to the 15 Security Software product
market leaders in 1998 (stock of patents at 1999)
Firm cited Numbers of citations
IBM 43
Motorola 27
Compaq-HP 23
Science Applications 19
AT&T 18
Sun Microsystems 14
Matsushita 13
Secure Computing 13
NSA Labs 11
Interdigital 9
Total 190
Other 256
Data source is the USPTO. We take the top 15 market leaders in
SSI in 1998 according to Hoover’s. We collect all the patents
granted in the sample period to these market leaders. We
analyse the backward citations of these patents and we see
which are the firms most cited by these market leaders. Even
controlling for the firms that dominate the downstream market for
products in SSI, the evidence of Table 1 is confirmed: large ITC
firms are the most important sources of patent knowledge
spillovers.
Table 3 Firm sample by sector
Sector Firms Commercial alliances Patents after 1992 Patents before 1992 Sales (‘000$)
Electronics 46 1.61 17.25 1.42 16,612
Hardware 29 2.30 29.05 4.70 9,137
Software 32 1.78 9.54 0.09 2,084
Telecommunications 29 1.81 25.08 2.21 13,274
Other 38 1.81 8.29 0.19 71,177
Total 174
Data from Infotrac, USPTO, Hoover’s. Core sector corresponds to the SIC code of the main business of the firm, Electronics (38),
Hardware (357), Software (737), Telecommunication (366). This table shows the basic statistics of the sample according to sector
classification. Our sample represents a quite heterogeneous group of de alio entrants from different business experiences.
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significance of coefficients in the two equations. According
toequation (5), we will divide our covariates in capabilities-
based variables (v) and control variables (z).
According to model intuitions, under inertial assumption
we expect that only the z variables should be significant in
explaining both the entry and the entry timing decision. In
the rational case, the z variables will mainly explain the
decision of entry, while the capability variables (v) will
determine the entry order. So in econometric terms:
bv ¼ 0
dv ¼ 0
dz; bz 6¼ 0
8<
: ð7Þ
if the inertial assumption is confirmed, while
bv ¼ dz ¼ 0
dv; bz 6¼ 0

ð8Þ
if the rational hypothesis holds.
Main covariates and controls
We divide the covariates in the two different groups; one
is composed by variables (vi) that could be defined as
strategic options tailored specifically to compete in SSI. The
other is formed by controls (z¯), namely variables that, not
directly linked with the SSI market, are quasi-exogenous,
not modifiable in the short run.
Let us illustrate first the capability variables. A previous
work on SSI (Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2007) shows that
patents and alliances are important factors beyond firm
survival in SSI. More general, the real option literature
stresses the importance of technological (Dong-Jae and
Kogut, 1996) and networking capabilities (Kogut and
Kulatilaka, 1994) as strategic options that favour the entry
in new markets by incumbent firms. We then introduce the
pre-entry number of firm patents in 380 USPTO class
(Cryptology). We use three specifications: PATENT1 the
patent rough number; PATENT2 the number of patents
divided by the logarithm of firm sales; PATENT3 the
number of patent multiply by their received citations as a
measure of patent value. In an entry time regression model,
Schoenecker and Cooper (1998) proxy firm R&D intensity
with R&D expenditures. In this paper, patents represent a
more accurate measure given that we can select with high
precision the technological class that is strategic for the
industry. Patent and citations data are downloaded from
the USPTO website. Cryptology patents are one of the best
proxies for firm capabilities that are strategic options in
SSI, because the more a firm knows about a key technology
for a market, the quicker it should size the business
opportunity.
ALLIANCE is the pre-entry number of firm commercial
alliances in SSI. It is a common strategy to use collaborative
links as a mean to build a dedicated sales force and test
market effective profitability (Mitchell and Singh, 1996;
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). The fact that a firm signs a
number of commercial alliances in a sector before entry
with its own products may also signal the high level of
market uncertainty perceived. If the number of pre-entry
alliances measures the firm’s demand for information, the
more the information needed, the riskier is the firm
Figure 1 Entry order distribution of de alio entrants in Security Software. Y axis
number of firms entered, X axis year lags from 1989, year of industry
inception. The graph shows the dynamics of de alio firm entry in SSI since the
industry inception. The most populated cohorts are the 1996 (8-year lags) and
the 1998 (10-year lags).
Table 4 Covariate descriptive statistics (174 observations)
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
PATENT1 13.046 29.391 0 243
PATENT2 2.546 14.420 0 187.674
PATENT3 2567.247 15640.666 0 144981
ALLIANCE1 1.040 1.567 0 29
ALLIANCE2 0.167 0.266 0 1.76107
ROA 0.390 0.182 0.300 0.482
SALES 7.568 2.790 0.027 11.251
Dummy hardware 0.167 0.374 0 1
Dummy software 0.184 0.389 0 1
Dummy electronics 0.264 0.442 0 1
Dummy telecom. 0.167 0.374 0 1
Data sources are Infotrac, USPTO, Hoover’s. The table shows the basic descriptive statistics of the main core variables and
controls used in the regression (Table 5). Especially looking at the column of the standard deviation, one can observe an important
heterogeneity in the variable values among the sample firms. This means that de alio entrants in SSI are endowed with different real
option capabilities.
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perception of a market. We adopt the same sector precision
used along the paper, selecting only the agreements
classified with the SIC code 73726. Information about
alliances is similarly drawn from Infotrac’s Insite Promt
database. We download two categories of firm events:
strategic alliances and joint-ventures, both with an evident
marketing, commercial and distribution aim. With these
types of alliances, the de alio firm is mainly acting as a
market distributor, reselling or including SSI products of
other firms in its software packages. We use two specifica-
tions: ALLIANCE1 the number of alliances and ALLIANCE2
the number of alliances divided by the logarithm of firm
Table 5 Results of generalized Tobit estimation
Entry decision Y¼ 0, 1
Constant 3.806** 3.128** 3.819** 4.307** 4.333** 4.657**
(0.366) (0.619) (0.791) (1.450) (0.658) (1.982)
PATENT1 0.003 0.004
PATENT2 0.000 0.000 (0.007) (0.008) 0.002 0.000
PATENT3 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
ALLIANCE1 0.539 0.206 0.296 0.336 0.222 0.474
ALLIANCE2 (0.988) (0.793) (0.636) (0.712) (0.530) (0.577)
ROA 0.221** 0.182** 0.163** 0.202** 0.300** 0.278**
(0.031) (0.077) (0.037) (0.044) (0.027) (0.019)
SIZE 0.082** 0.079** 0.080* 0.148** 0.159** 0.163**
(0.044) (0.049) (0.050) (0.062) (0.065) (0.058)
Dummy hardware 2.328** 2.229** 2.083** 2.521** 2.287** 2.115**
(0.425) (0.511) (0.680) (0.524) (0.194) (0.786)
Dummy software 2.428** 2.940** 2.925** 2.293** 2.478** 2.270**
(0.370) (0.948) (0.374) (0.850) (0.232) (0.809)
Dummy electronics 0.819 0.760 0.604 1.240* 1.701* 1.596*
(0.555) (0.673) (0.596) (0.596) (0.803) (0.624)
Dummy telecom. 1.357* 1.254* 1.582* 1.903** 1.270 1.296*
(0.571) (0.523) (0.595) (0.694) (0.701) (0.657)
Entry order decision J¼ 1, 2, 3,y
Constant 13.748** 13.687** 13.269** 15.042** 15.548** 15.216**
(2.198) (2.208) (2.798) (3.643) (4.624) (3.456)
PATENT1 0.002 0.013
PATENT2 0.000 0.000 (0.009) (0.044) 0.002 0.000
PATENT3 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
ALLIANCE1 0.818 0.702 0.811 1.328 1.152 1.237
ALLIANCE2 (0.539) (0.519) (0.647) (1.218) (1.549) (1.717)
ROA 0.613** 0.667** 0.675** 0.082** 0.084** 0.070*
(0.071) (0.075) (0.065) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001)
SIZE 0.016 0.028 0.024 0.046 0.081 0.062
(0.215) (0.353) (0.189) (0.168) (0.689) (0.953)
Dummy hardware 4.665** 4.166** 4.378** 4.557** 5.668** 5.232**
(1.813) (1.313) (1.509) (1.778) (1.676) (1.172)
Dummy software 3.915** 3.684** 3.928** 3.109** 3.305** 3.247**
(1.054) (1.085) (1.037) (1.067) (1.015) (1.058)
Dummy electronics 5.202* 5.940** 5.236* 5.839** 5.352** 5.122**
(2.609) (2.716) (2.734) (2.848) (2.366) (2.454)
Dummy telecom. 5.590** 5.696** 5.434** 5.873 5.618 5.396
(1.562) (1.559) (1.495) (3.635) (3.291) (3.966)
Log-likelihood 104.7 103.8 105.5 112.7 135.4 125.1
174 Observations. Dependent variable in the first step entry decision (yes/no), in the second step entry order (1, 2, 3y year lags from
1989). Standard errors in parentheses. Level of significance **0.05, *0.10. The core variables of this study, patents and alliances, are not
significant in explaining entry order decisions of de alio entrants. Therefore, the real option capabilities of the de alio firms do not explain
with statistical significance the entry order patterns of de alio firms.
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sales. In sum, ALLIANCE is another good proxy for firm
capability options, since the riskier the firm perceived the
market, the more useful will be networking as a strategic
option (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).
We now move to control variables, z¯ of our model.
SALES are the firm sales at the year of entry. It is the
classical proxy for size. We use it in the log specification.
Sales data are taken from Hoover’s (www.hoovers.com), an
online database, which collects financial data for the
Security Software & Services industry. Moreover, size could
be interpreted as a rough proxy of firm level of diversifica-
tion. Therefore, it could also test the ability of more
diversified firm to promptly absorb external knowledge,
recognize new business opportunity and exploiting econo-
mies of scope (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Finally,
size is highly correlated with age, and it could measure firm
experience.
ROA is the ratio between the firm Return on Asset and
the average ROA of all the firms already competing in SSI at
the firm entry year. Note that the standardization is also
needed to avoid problems of collinearity. It measures the
proportion between the profitability of the new market and
the one derived from activities in existing businesses. This
covariate aims to test the Aron and Lazear’ (1990)
assumption that firm tend to seek risky new markets when
profits in existing businesses are decreasing. Data are
from Hoover’s.
SECTOR DUMMIES. Sector dummies aim to capture the
technological and downstream distance between incumbent
core sectors and SSI. In fact, it should be easier to enter in
SSI being a software firm rather than a telecommunication
or a consumer electronic producer (Teece et al., 1994). We
introduce four dummy variables: software (Dummy Soft-
ware), hardware (Dummy Hardware), consumer electronics
(Dummy Electronics) and telecommunications (Dummy
Telecommunications). Firm core business was taken from
Hoover’s. The omitted OTHER dummy accounts mainly for
consultancy firms and credit card producers.
For those firms that did not enter in the sample period we
assume that they will never enter (data are right censored).
Table 4 provides the basic statistics for the covariates.
Results
We estimate a generalized Tobit model using the above
covariates. Looking at the results (see Table 5), firm
strategic capabilities, PATENT and ALLIANCE, in all their
specifications, are not significant. The results replicate the
case of equation (7) and the inertial behaviour seems to be
confirmed by SSI data.
About the controls, ROA is significant both in the entry
and entry time decision. The sign is in line with prediction:
the lower is the level of the profitability in the existing
business, the higher is the firm probability to enter in new
business. In the entry time regression the sign is negative.
The interpretation is that, given the entry, most of the
firms wait until the observed profits in the new market
were high enough.
SALES has a significant and positive effect on the entry
probability while do not affect the time of entry. This effect
is expected: Largest firms could count on more resources to
build up entry attempts and they have more experience in
building business model for a new entry.
Sector dummies are very important in the entry
decision process. All dummies tend to be significant. Data
confirm an important regularity: It was easier to enter in
SSI for software or hardware producers compared to all the
other sectors. Sector proximities make a difference.
Although intuitive, this finding is remarkable, because it
is quite uncommon to find this hypothesis tested in
literature.
Trying to draw some general insights from these results,
the entry decision is influenced mainly by the proximity
between the new market and the firm core business, by the
level of expected average profitability of the new market
and by firm size, while firm ad hoc patent and networking
capabilities does not play any role. SSI data seem to support
the assumption that de alio entrants utilize adapting
mechanisms of decision that do not take in account entry
order as a strategic tool. Firm capabilities that could be
strategic options do not affect the process of entry while
controls tend to explain most of the firm entry variance.
Roughly speaking, in SSI incumbent entry time decisions
are similar to a process of repetitive ‘rule of the thumb’
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of core covariates in the most populated entry order cohorts
Entry order time (year lags from 1989) 12 10 9 8 7
Alliances
Average 3.5 2.8 22.6 4.42 3.33
Stand. Dev. 2.12 2.38 7.76 3.69 3.21
Max 5 7 29 10 7
Min 2 1 14 1 1
Patents
Average 42 11.8 32 34.1 20.6
Stand. Dev. 16.97 7.46 22.11 72.8 35.7
Max 54 19 57 198 62
Min 30 2 15 0 0
Data sources are Infotrac and USPTO. We calculate average values for alliances and patents in the time cohorts that show the highest
firm entry rates. Entry cohorts are indicated by year lags from industry inception (1989). Each entry cohort is populated by firms that show
a heterogeneous endowment of patents and alliances. This is consistent with the regression findings (Table 5): heterogeneous firms in
terms of real option capabilities took similar decisions of entry order.
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interpretation of the competitive landscape. Firm entry
order time appears to be not the direct outcome of a
process of rational strategic decision, but a sub-product of
an entry-vs-no entry algorithm that firms activate.
In order to confirm this view, we calculated the
Pearson correlation coefficient among residuals of the
two estimations, e^ and r^. Not surprising, the correla-
tion coefficient equals 0.405 with a significance level
of 0.028.
Moreover, Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics for
the most populated entry time cohorts. It is evident the
high heterogeneity in terms of capabilities among firms
inside the cohorts. Why firms that have so different
capability platforms take the same entry time decision?
Our answer is that entry order decisions of heterogeneous
firms could coincide, if the firm capabilities that are
strategic options are negligible elements in firm decision
processes. If we think that de alio entrants are to some
extent inertial, the most obvious effect is the similarities of
entry order patterns among different firms. This clearly
confirms the evidence that entry is not a smooth,
homogeneous phenomenon, but it occurs in waves
(Geroski, 1995). Finally, a robustness check, results are
confirmed if we adopt different econometric models, logit
regression for entry decision and simple Tobit regressions
for entry order.
Conclusions
Up to date, literature presents two contrasting hypotheses
to explain the latecomer attitude of de alio entrants in
new markets: the rational vs the inertial hypothesis. Using
as background the theory of capabilities as real
options (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001), this article presents
one of the first empirical tests of these two hypotheses.
Our empirical evidence based on SSI supports the view that
de alio firms ignore some capabilities as real options
because they suffer by inertia in the entry decision
processes (Henderson and Clark, 1990). This implies
that de alio entry performance is sub-optimal and it
could be increased if managers adopt a more rational
entry order strategy. Our evidence bridges also a gap
between the management and the economic literature: our
results are consistent with the industry life cycle evidence
that shows how firms with a heterogeneous endowment of
capabilities cluster their entry in similar period of time
(Geroski, 1995).
Clearly, de alio entrants will not always fail in new
markets. This article only suggests that the inertial attitude
of de alio entrants could create difficulties in competing in
new sectors, even if the de alio firms own all the resources
necessary to build up a sustainable competitive advantage.
For example, SystemSoft, a medium size company
specialized in operating system design, tried to exploit SSI
rising demand since 1995 implementing a diversification
strategy. In so doing, the firm signed several technological
and marketing agreements with large ICT firms and in 1996
it bought Radish Communications System, with the aim of
integrating Radish’s competencies in data transmission
technology. Nevertheless, Systemsoft never coped with its
direct competitors like Network Associates and Symantec
that entered in the sector some years before. After having
realized a loss in 1997, Systemsoft tried to react with cost
saving strategies but in 1999 the company filed for
bankruptcy protection. In 1999 it sold off its assets to
Rocket Software. ‘We were late on many issues, and there
were too many already consolidated specialized competi-
tors. Hard to believe, there was a rising demand for
security products and we were not able to find good
customers’, affirmed a product manager of Systemsoft
(BusinessWire, 1999).
Our work presents some limitations and some caveats
should be posed. One evident drawback is that we could
not measure the post-entry performance of de alio entrants
in SSI and so we cannot evaluate the importance of
entry order in terms of performance. However, direct
interviews conducted with some start-up managers confirm
that early-comer start-ups have gained sound first
mover advantages, especially in terms of downstream assets
and product reputation. In these interviews, it surprisingly
emerged that often start-ups does not perceive de alio
entrants as direct competitors. Second, we are aware
that entry process is analysed in a particular niche of
software industry characterized by low entry and exit
barriers and high rate of product innovation. The lack of
any industry variance could limit the generality of our
results, especially in terms of testing the link between
capability real options and different levels of uncertainty.
Further works should investigate these issues in other
industries.
These limitations notwithstanding, the article discloses
how inertial behaviours reduce the strategic value of firm
capabilities. Even with perfect information, top managers
should be aware that strategic mistakes in entry order could
cause an under-exploitation of firm resources. This point
relates directly to the concept of myopia in the management
literature. The difference in the extent of firm performance
could rely not only in the validity of the managers’ strategic
plans but also in the quality of the observation – especially
of the links among firm resources, their potential applica-
tions in novel downstream product markets and entry
order decisions (Dosi and Kogut, 1993). Therefore, when
analytic observation is the real strategic option, myopia
could be harmful.4
Notes
1 I thank the EMR Editor Bruce Kogut and two anonymous
reviewers. The paper improves thanks also to the comments of
Ashish Arora, Giovanni Dosi, Andrea Fosfuri, Steven Klepper,
Alfonso Gambardella, Salvatore Torrisi and seminar parteci
pants at Merit, IESE, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies,
UC3M, WZB, Druid Summer Conference, EURAM Conference.
Sponsoring from the Spanish Ministry of Science is gratefully
acknowledged (SEJ2005 06655 and HI2005 0380). All errors
are mine.
2 Entry order decision is usually not a meditated process for
entrepreneurial start ups (the de novo entrants) that take their
entry order decisions with scarce alternative options and low
opportunity costs.
3 ‘Worldwide Internet Security Software Market to close in on 4.4
billion dollars in 1999’, EDP Weekly’s IT Monitor, 40(32), 1999: 18.
4 For the distinction between inference and analytic observation,
see also Poe (1841).
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